Take Bulletin: Q2 2025

This Bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns that were completed on our platforms in the 2nd quarter of 2025. It was last updated on July 21, 2025.

April

• We completed 43 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Turkey. The campaign shared content in Turkish, supporting the Turkish victory party.
• We completed 6 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in Russian and Ukrainian, which supported Russia and critically to Ukraine.
• We completed 37 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in English and Russian that supported Russia and critically to Ukraine.
• We completed 22 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in English, Polish, Russian and Ukrainian, which supported Russia and critically to Ukraine, Poland and the West.
• We blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The domain shared content in Russian about culture and society in Eastern Europe.
• We completed 12 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in Farsi, Russian and Bahasa Indonesian, supporting Russia, Iran and China and critical of NATO and the West.
• We completed 3 YouTube channels and 1 blogger blog as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in English and French that supported Russia and critically to Ukraine and the West.
• We completed 1,045 YouTube channels and blocked 2 domains from justification to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations related to Russia. The campaign was linked to a Russian consulting firm and shared content in Russian that supported Russia and critically to Ukraine and the West.
• We completed 4 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to Russian state -sponsored units and shared content in Russian who supported Russia and critically to Ukraine.
• We completed 12 YouTube channels, 1 ad account, 1 AdSense account and blocked 9 domains from the eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations related to Romania. The campaign shared content in Romanian, supporting a specific Romanian political party.
• We blocked 2 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Iran. The campaign shared content in Arabic, which was critical of the United States, Israel and the West.
• We completed 12 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Iran. The campaign shared content in Arabic, supporting the Iranian government and Palestine and critical of Israel.
• We completed 1 ad account and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Ghana. The campaign was linked to a digital marketing company and shared content in English about candidates in the Ghanaian presidential election. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Meta and Openai.
• We completed 356 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Azerbaijan. The campaign shared content in Azerbaijanic, which supported Azerbaijan and critical of Armenia and critics of the Azerbaijan Government.
• We completed 4 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The campaign shared content in English and Chinese that supported China and critical of the Philippines.
• We completed 1,545 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing study of coordinated influence operations associated with China. The coordinated Inauthentic network uploaded content in Chinese and English about China and US foreign affairs. These findings are in line with our previous reports.

May

• We completed 20 YouTube channels, 4 ad accounts and 1 blogger blog as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to the Russian state -controlled media output RT and shared content in Spanish, English, Serbian and Russian, which supported Russia and critically to Ukraine and the West.
• We completed 6 YouTube channels and 1 ad account as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The campaign shared content in English that supported CRC and President Xi Jinping.
• We completed 1 YouTube channel as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to Russian state -sponsored units and shared content in Russian who supported Russia and critically to Ukraine.
• We completed 507 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to a Russian consulting firm and shared content in Russian that supported Russia and critically to Ukraine and the West.
• We completed 457 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Azerbaijan. The campaign shared content in Azerbaijanic, which supported Azerbaijan and critical of Armenia and critics of the Azerbaijan Government.
• We completed 3,592 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing study of coordinated influence operations associated with China. The coordinated Inauthentic network uploaded content in Chinese and English about China and US foreign affairs. These findings are in line with our previous reports.

June

• We completed 2 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign shared content in Spanish and English that supported Russia and critically to Ukraine and the EU.
• We completed 2 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to Russian state -sponsored units and shared content in Russian who supported Russia and critically to Ukraine.
• We completed 392 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Russia. The campaign was linked to a Russian consulting firm and shared content in Russian that supported Russia and critically to Ukraine and the West.
• We completed 4 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Israel. The campaign shared content in English, French, German, Italian and Greek, which supported Israel and critical of Palestine.
• We completed 228 YouTube channels as part of our study of coordinated influence operations associated with Azerbaijan. The campaign shared content in Azerbaijanic, which supported Azerbaijan and critical of Armenia and critics of the Azerbaijan Government.
• We completed 2,598 YouTube channels and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News Surfaces and discover as part of our ongoing study of coordinated influence operations associated with China. The coordinated Inauthentic network uploaded content in Chinese and English about China and US foreign affairs. These findings are in line with our previous reports.